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Abstract
In the international health care literature there is a broad discussion on impacts
of competition in health care markets. But aspects of standardization in regional
health care markets with no price competition received comparatively little atten-
tion. We use a typical Hotelling-framework (reference case) to analyze a regional
health care market with two health care providers competing in (vertical) quality
after the scope of medical treatment is set (horizontal quality). We conclude, that
in the reference case both health care provider will use vertical quality to separate
from each other. In the next step (standardization case) we introduce one health
care provider to be the standard leader in vertical quality. In the standardization
case a more homogeneous supply can be expected. But, there is a higher possibility
that the standard follower has to leave the regional health care market.
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1 Introduction
The international literature has devoted much attention to the analysis of compe-
tition in health care markets (see for example Dranove and Satterthwaite (2000);
Gaynor and Vogt (2000)). In this context, most authors focus on horizontal com-
petition (cf. Dranove and Satterthwaite (2000); Gaynor and Haas-Wilson (1998);
Pauly (1998)). Limited attention has been paid to standardization effects and hor-
izontal competition within a regional health care market. Nevertheless, in many
health care systems there is a tendency to enforce standardization in inpatient as
well as outpatient care. As this has direct impacts on the competition environment
within a regional health care market these effects are modeled in this paper.
In this paper we analyse spatial competition between two health care providers.
We elaborate the relationship between two health care providers and the mar-
ket performance with and without standardization. For this, we will develop an
expanded Hotelling-model in two steps:
In the first step we analyse quality choice. We allow the suppliers to choose their
location, their scope of treatments and the quality of treatments being offered.
In the following we use the term horizontal quality when we focus on the choice
of location and scope of treatments.1 We use the term vertical quality when we
analyse the quality of treatments being offered. We call this first step the reference
case.
In the second step we introduce standardization, e. g. a standard of vertical
quality for treatments in the regional health care market. We call this case the
standardization case. The standard could be the result of a benchmark process
initiated by the regulator or a cost payer (insurance company). This means, we
assume that a third party is able to observe the vertical qualities and to prescribe
the higher quality as a standard. This standard is binding for all health care
suppliers, even those whose optimal quality is lower. A typical backwards induction
model will be employed. We show that the health care provider with lower costs
for producing vertical quality is the standard leader. The other one is the standard
follower. In this scenario we focus on the effects of vertical quality standardization.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the typical characteristics
of a regional health care market. Section 3.1 introduces the basic model of spatial
competition. The model is expanded in section 3.2 to include a standardization
process in the regional health care market. Section 4 summarizes our findings and
outlines their implications for further research.
1This means we have two possible interpretations for horizontal quality.
2
2 Regional Health Care Markets
For the discussion it is necessary to define the conditions and restrictions outpa-
tient (physicians) and inpatient (hospitals) health care providers face within the
regional market. In a typical patient-physician-situation, patient’s primary de-
mand is directed to a physician who diagnoses the patient and makes the first
treatment decisions. For more severe illnesses the patient will be referred to a
higher equipped health care provider for appropriate care. This can be an outpa-
tient specialist or a hospital. For the sake of simplicity we assume that the patient
is free to choose between health care providers, i.e. we do not differentiate be-
tween inpatient and outpatient care. In contrast to other markets, prices in health
care markets are regularly set by a regulator or the third payer (insurance).2 This
strengthens the relevance of competition in quality.
In the tradition of industrial economics, we distinguish between vertical quality
and horizontal quality. Patient’s preferences for vertical quality are uniformly
ranked, i.e. all patients prefer a higher vertical quality. Consequently, all patients
are better off when the level of medical quality health care provider 1 offers rises.3
Horizontal quality on the other hand refers to characteristics, where the optimal
choice depends on the characteristics of the consumer. In the case of health care
providers location or the range of treatments offered can be considered as hori-
zontal quality variables. Patients which are closer to health care provider 1 have
less opportunity costs than those located closer to the other one. In contrast to a
rise in vertical quality a rise in horizontal quality does not necessarily constitute
a pareto improvement. Consumers, whose optimal horizontal quality was close to
the offered horizontal quality before the change, may face a pronounced decline in
utility as the deviation between their desired quality and the quality offered in-
creases. Consumers, whose preferences are now better aligned with market quality,
on the other hand, gain in utility (cf. Shy (1995)).
For the purpose of this paper we regard it as impractical to treat horizontal dif-
ferentiation only as the choice of location, like the Hotelling-model does. Once
chosen horizontal quality is necessarily fixed for the time being. Therefore, the
only remaining choice concernes vertical quality. We propose to look at the range
of treatments offered instead and interpret increased horizontal quality as a larger
(and therefore less specialized) scope of treatments offered by a particular health
care provider.
2We will therefore treat prices as fixed in this paper.
3The same argument applies to health care provider 2.
3
3 Model of Quality Competition
3.1 Basic Model
A simple model of a regional health care market can be derived from the papers
of Glazer and McGuire (1993) or Montefiori (2005). Considering the results of
Gravelle (1999) and Calem and Rizzo (1995) we use the approach of the spatial
competition literature to model the effects of standardization. This should provide
a good intuition for the probable consequences of the implementation of a new form
of standardized care.
Brekke, Nutscheler, and Staume (2006) develop a specific model that combines
ideas of spatial competition in the tradition of Hotelling (1929) with quality com-
petition. This is our point of reference in this paper.4 Like them we employ a
two-stage model of health care provision with fixed prices. In the first stage, each
health care provider decides on horizontal quality. He selects his range of treat-
ments offered.5 After the decision on horizontal differentiation at the first stage,
the health care providers compete by choosing the quality of care they provide in
the second stage, i.e. by choosing a level of vertical quality.
3.1.1 Demand for Health Care
As a first step we model patient’s demand for health care. We follow Hotelling’s
idea of a linear city6 and assume rational consumers with perfect and complete
information about all relevant parameters.
The term ai denotes the absolute position of the health care provider i on the [0, 1]
interval.7 We assume health care provider 1 is located left within the spectrum and
health care provider 2 is located right (a1 ∈ [0; 0.5−] and a2 ∈ [0.5+; 1]). Hence,
we assume there is a perceivable horizontal quality difference so that patient’s
location or need for a specific treatment will generally direct them to one of the
providers, i.e. the average patient is not indifferent between health care providers
but has a decided preference for one.
4In contrast to Brekke, Nutscheler, and Staume (2006) we do not attempt to find an optimal
reimbursement scheme or the reimbursement level that will maximize welfare.
5Interested readers are referred to Robinson and Casalino (1996) and Gal-Or (1999) for an in
depth discussion of this topic.
6The presentation of the basic model follows Tirole (1988): 96 ff.
7ai stands for the chosen location in the spatial interpretation. In the service differentiation case
it denotes the range of treatments offered.
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Demand for a (specific) unit of health care hl is assumed to be independently
identically distributed on the [0; 1] interval.8 In addition to horizontal quality we
consider vertical quality in the standard of care for any given treatment, which is
described by the parameter qk.
The variable costs for crossing the distance to a regional provider are borne by the
patient. They are assumed to be constant and denoted by t. As we have noted
before, within the model pm, the price for medical treatment, is independent of the
scope of medical treatment and the vertical quality offered. Now, we additionally
assume pm is regulated and fix for all health care providers.9
Similar to Brekke, Nutscheler, and Staume (2006) each patient faces the following
objective:
LA(h, qk, pm) = u¯+ qk − t · (hl − ai)2 − pm (3.1)
To maximize his utility, the patient has to decide whether health care provider 1
or health care provider 2 are entitled to treat him.10 We assume, that net utility
is always positive, even for the lowest vertical quality possible. The whole market
is always covered and for a regulated price pm which is equal for all patients. Each
consumer demands one unit of the good as we assume that a second unit does
not offer additional utility. The indifferent patient between the both health care
providers has the location h¯ which is the solution to:
q1 − t(h¯− a1)2 = q2 − t(a2 − h¯)2 (3.2)
The result allows us to denote the position h in the linear city. Both health care
providers face the same indifferent patient. Consequently, health care provider
one’s demand y1 is the fraction of the market just up to the marginal consumer h¯.
h¯ =
q2 − q1
2t(a1 − a2) +
a1 + a2
2
(3.3)
For the other health care provider y2 = 1− h¯ holds.
For the non-spatial case there is an intuitive interpretation of this variable. If h¯
is high, a substantial part of patients choose health care providers offering a wide
8Differences between hl and ai represent a quality mismatch. Opportunity costs are the costs
consumers face because the range of treatments offered by a given medical care provider does
not exactly match their preferences (cf. Shy (1995) and can be computed by multiplying the
actual mismatch with a cost parameter t).
9As we assume all patients are insured, they do not face variable costs of treatment. Effects on
insurance premia are either non existent or not perceptible for patients. It is important to note
that this price for treatment is not identical with hospital remuneration which we will denote
later by p¯.
10The model is limited to selective medical treatments a patient can anticipate and plan.
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range of treatments. If h¯ is low, the majority prefers treatment by providers with
a lower degree of horizontal quality ai, i.e. by providers who specialize in a small
number of treatments.
We split expression (3.3) into three parts:11
h¯ = (q2 − q1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
vertical quality difference
· 1
2t(a1 − a2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
degree of competition
+
a1 + a2
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
average horizontal quality
(3.4)
The position of h¯, the marginal consumer, depends on vertical quality difference,
the degree of competition and average horizontal quality. We are particularly
interested in the degree of competition. From the second term over braces we infer
that the degree of competition rises when t low and/or the gap between a1 and a2
is small, i.e. there is little differentiation in horizontal quality.
3.1.2 Supply of Health Care
Taking health care provider 1 as our representative producer in a world with two
health care providers, we get the following profit function:
Π1 = (p¯− c1) · y1 −
(
ϕ1 · q
2
1
2
)
− CF1 (3.5)
We set p¯ for the regulated price all health care suppliers face. We suppose that
reimbursements cover costs, i.e. that cn 6 p¯ is valid. If reimbursements do not
cover costs there will be no voluntary supply, consequently, this case is irrelevant
in a market economy.12 The parameter cn signifies the variable cost of a treatment
while CFn denotes fixed cost. The variable costs occur if the the minimum level of
quality (ϕ0 = 0) is provided. The costs ϕ0 for producing higher vertical quality qk
are supposed to be convex.13 Costs for a given level of vertical quality are therefore
a combination of the variable costs for the provision of basic quality and a higher
vertical quality cost increment.
There are already a few very straightforward results to be derived from this profit
function. Profit can only be positive, if reimbursements exceed variable costs
(p¯ > c1) and rises with the difference between these two variables. Variable cost
11Cf. Pfähler and Wiese (2006): 244.
12The case where this condition is not met presents us with an argument against insufficiently
high reimbursements, as these could lead to low levels of quality and a sub-optimally narrow
range of treatments. Interested readers are referred to Newhouse (1996) and Pope (1989).
13K(qk) = ϕ q
2
2 . See Brekke, Nutscheler, and Staume (2006): 212.
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for vertical quality ϕ1 and fixed costs CF1 have a negative impact on profits. These
results are general and do not depend on the specifications of the model.
Substituting the results derived in (3.3) into the profit function we get:
Π1 = (p¯− c1) ·
(
q2 − q1
2t(a1 − a2) +
a1 + a2
2
)
−
(
ϕ1 · q
2
1
2
)
− CF1 (3.6)
Now we analyze the effects of decisions on vertical and horizontal quality. We know,
that provider 1 has a smaller ai than provider 2, therefore the first term within the
brackets can only be positive if q1 > q2. Provider 1, the provider with the smaller
range of treatments offered in the non-spatial interpretation, has an incentive to
offer higher vertical quality, because this increases his profits. If he offers a lower
vertical quality, the difference in horizontal quality between providers will lower
his profits in comparison to the case where both providers offer homogenous goods.
For this vertical quality distribution, profits for a provider with the higher vertical
quality rise, the smaller the difference in horizontal quality (a1−a2) and the smaller
transport costs t are. Consequently, there is an incentive to diversify horizontally
for this provider.
3.1.3 Optimal Vertical Quality
In the standard case we assume that both health care providers offer different levels
of vertical quality. The first order condition for the profit-maximizing quality q1 is:
∂Π1
∂q1
= − p¯− c1
2t(a1 − a2) − q1 · ϕ1 = 0 (3.7)
As we have assumed that a1 < a2 the above equation only holds if p¯ ≥ c1. Oth-
erwise the first order condition for a profit-maximum would not be satisfied, as
Π1 < 0. Profit-maximizing vertical quality14 can be written as:
q∗1 =
−p¯+ c1
2t(a1 − a2)ϕ1 (3.8)
Comparative static for optimal quality yield for a1 < a2:15
dq∗1
da1
=
p¯− c1
2t(a1 − a2)2 · ϕ1 (3.9)
14The second-order condition is negative (∂
2Π1
∂q21
= −ϕ0).
15For the discussion of health care provider 2 cf. Appendix A.1.
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This equation tells us, that there is an inverse relation between horizontal and
vertical quality for health care provider 1. If a1 rises and therefore c.p. approaches
a2 q1 rises. The closer the offers of the health care providers are, the higher
the incentive of the provider with the smaller range of treatments to offer a high
vertical quality. The implication of this relationship can be expressed in everyday
words: The further apart the health care providers are, the lower the quality they
will probably offer.
Comparing this result with the impact of a2 gives:
dq∗1
da2
= − p¯− c1
2t(a1 − a2)2 · ϕ1 (3.10)
An increase in the (horizontal quality) distance between the two health care
providers increases provider 1’s incentive to offer a high level of vertical quality.
dq∗1
dt
=
p¯− c1
2t2 · (a1 − a2) · ϕ1 (3.11)
The incentive to provide quality is negatively related to t, the parameter denoting
transport cost or the cost of quality mismatch for patients. This is plausible,
as competition from other health care providers is lower when opportunity costs
(the product of the actual distance/quality mismatch and the cost parameter) are
high. If travelling has a higher negative impact on utility than putting up with
lower vertical quality, people will stay with their local health care provider and
the provider chooses his quality accordingly.
dq∗1
dc1
=
1
2t(a1 − a2) · ϕ1 < 0 (3.12)
As a1 < a2 is true per definition, the impact of an increase in c1 is to lower the
level of vertical quality. Costs directly reduce profit and consequently reduce the
incentive to compete via higher quality.
dq∗1
dϕ1
= − q1
ϕ1
< 0 (3.13)
The above equation shows that the negative relationship between costs and quality
is not only true for the cost of treatment, but also for the costs of quality improve-
ments ϕo. Again, a reduction of profits lowers the incentive to compete for them
via higher vertical quality.
3.1.4 Optimal Horizontal Quality
When determining optimal horizontal quality ai for each health care provider we
have to keep in mind that a1 < a2 is true per definition. In other words, for provider
8
1 an increase in a1 would reduce differentiation between providers, whereas an
increase in a2 would c.p. induce a greater distance. Backwards induction stipulates
both health care providers to choose an optimal level of q∗k when determining
optimal horizontal quality a1. Inserting q∗k into equation (3.6) gives us the new
profit function:
Π1 = (p¯− c1) ·
(
q∗2 − q∗1
2t(a1 − a2) +
(a1 + a2)
2
)
−
(
ϕ1 · q
∗
1
2
2)
− CF (3.14)
The implicit optimal value of a1 considering the first order condition is:
∂Π1
∂a1
= (p¯−c1)·
[
1
2
− q
∗
2 − q∗1
2t(a1 − a2)2 −
1
2t(a1 − a2) ·
(
∂q∗2
∂a1
− ∂q
∗
1
∂a1
)
− ϕ1 · q∗1 ·
∂q∗1
∂a1
]
= 0
(3.15)
We expect that the optimal level of a1 and a2 will equal the extreme values within
the range ai ∈ [0, 1] resulting in maximum differentiation in horizontal quality. But
we can directly infer from the implicit function used beyond that this assumption
only holds for no difference in vertical quality. As soon as there is a difference
in vertical quality, the health care provider, which is in a quality leading position
may be able to reduce his horizontal differentiation.
Looking at the marginal differentiation of both profit functions we can infer that
∂Π1
∂ a1
< 0 and∂Π2
∂ a2
> 0 holds.16 Considering health care provider 1 we observe that
the second derivative is also negative which means that there is a local profit
maximum at the left side of the range a1 ∈ [0, 1].17 We can can assume a reaction
function for the optimal values a∗i :18
a∗1 = f(a2) and a
∗
2 = f(a1) (3.16)
Looking at the sign of the reaction functions we argue that ∂ a
∗
1(a2)
∂ a2
> 0 and vice
versa. Hence, considering the constraint a1 < a2 and with respect to the equation
we formulate the following: Given one health care provider has set his horizontal
quality, the other health care provider will set his horizontal quality contingent on
the given level of ai. From what we have seen above we conclude, that horizontal
quality ai is an important parameter for the competitors.
16Cf. Appendix (A.10).
17Cf. Appendix (A.2) Although it might be interesting to consider quality choice by a provider,
who is not able to choose his location freely in view of existing regulations. The scope of this
paper is limited and we have to refrain from discussing that particular topic.
18For the explicit solution cf. Appendix (A.10).
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3.2 Quality Competition in the Regional Health Care Mar-
ket
3.2.1 Reference Case
In the reference case we employ the assumption of the basic case where each health
care provider sets its own vertical quality qk. Now we want to discuss the values for
ai via backwards induction. We concentrate on horizontal quality and the impact
on competition if both health care providers assume that the other health care
provider acts simultaneously. The profit function of health care provider 1 is:
Π1 = (p¯− c1) ·
(
(a1 + a2)
2
+
q∗2 − q∗1
2t(a1 − a2)
)
−
(
ϕ1 · q
∗2
1
2
)
− CF (3.17)
Considering the first order condition, the following holds:
∂Π1
∂a1
= (p¯−c1)·
[
1
2
− q
∗
2 − q∗1
2t(a1 − a2)2 −
1
2t(a1 − a2) ·
(
∂q∗2
∂a1
− ∂q
∗
1
∂a1
)
− ϕ1 · q∗1 ·
∂q∗1
∂a1
]
= 0
(3.18)
Now we discuss the impact of a change of a2 on a1 from the perspective of health
care provider 1. The analysis encompasses comparative static for the optimal
level for a1 (stage one). As we cannot directly infer the marginal effects for the
first stage, we use the optimal level of qk and the marginal effects (stage two).19
Following the first-order condition for vertical quality, we compare the results for
both health care providers at the second stage:
q∗1 =
−p¯+ c1
2t(a1 − a2)ϕ1 for health care provider 1 (3.19)
q∗2 =
−p¯+ c2
2t(a1 − a2)ϕ2 for health care provider 2
For q∗1>q∗2 the following must be true:
q∗1 ≡
−p¯+ c1
2t(a1 − a2)ϕ1 > q
∗
2 ≡
−p¯+ c2
2t(a1 − a2)ϕ2 (3.20)
• if ϕ2 > ϕ1 and c1 = c2 is valid or
19In the following we concentrate on health care provider 1. The results for the other health care
provider are to be found in Appendix A.3.
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• if ϕ2 = ϕ1 and c1 < c2 is valid or
• if ϕ1 > ϕ2 and c2 >> c1 can be assumed
Under the described circumstances competition will always result in a higher ver-
tical quality for the health care provider with the lower ai.
A change of horizontal quality of health care provider 2 leads to:
da∗1
da2
=
6c2ϕ1 − 3c1ϕ2 + p¯ · (−6ϕ1 + 3ϕ2)
4c2ϕ1 − c1ϕ2 + p¯ · (−4ϕ1 + ϕ2) (3.21)
Looking at the fraction, we argue that the sign depends on the relationship be-
tween ci and ϕi. For symmetric variable cost the sign of the numerator and the
denominator will be dominated by p¯, therefore da
∗
1
da2
> 0.20 We therefore conclude
that a negative change in horizontal quality of health care provider 2 incites health
care provider 1 to reduce his horizontal quality given one of the cost parameters
(ϕ0 or cn) are equal.
This sheds light on the conditions that could be relevant for different qualities qk
if horizontal quality is set. Therefore, the decision for the horizontal quality at
stage one is taken in view of the capabilities for producing vertical quality.
The influence of the variable costs c1 can be described as follows:
da∗1
d c1
=
(a1 − a2) · (a2ϕ0 + c2ϕ1 − p¯ · (ϕ1 − 2ϕ2)− 2c1ϕ2)
((p¯− c1) · (−4c2ϕ1 + p¯ · (4ϕ1 − ϕ2) + c1ϕ2))
+
(a1 − a2) · (−2t2a31ϕ1ϕ2 + 6t2a2ϕ1ϕ2)
((p¯− c1) · (−4c2ϕ1 + p¯ · (4ϕ1 − ϕ2) + c1ϕ2)) (3.22)
+
(a1 − a2) · (2t2a32ϕ1ϕ2 − a1ϕ1 · (1 + 6t2a22ϕ2))
(p¯− c1) · (−4c2ϕ1 + p¯ · (4ϕ1 − ϕ2) + c1ϕ2))
The sign of the fraction is not directly clear. Hence, we use the following assump-
tion to get an idea of the relationship between horizontal and vertical quality.
The denominator will be positive
• if: ϕ2 = 4 · ϕ1
• or: ϕ2 > 4 · ϕ1 ∧ p¯ ≤ −c1ϕ1+4c2ϕ14ϕ−ϕ2
• or: ϕ2 < 4 · ϕ1 ∧ p¯ ≥ −c1ϕ1+4c2ϕ14ϕ−ϕ2 or
• or: c2 = c14 ∧ ϕ2 < 4 · ϕ1 ∧ p¯ ≥ −c1ϕ1+4c2ϕ14ϕ−ϕ2
20For the other cases it is impossible to infer results without further math.
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In this case a high level of a reimbursement p¯ makes the second, fourth and sixth
term of the numerator negative. Nevertheless, the whole numerator is positive as
long as a1 − a2 < 0. In consequence da
∗
1
dc1
> 0 could be assumed.
An increase of the marginal costs c1 will induce health care provider 1 to reduce
his horizontal quality. Additionally, both health care providers will be incited to
reduce their vertical quality ((3.12)).
For a change in quality costs ϕ1 the following holds:
da∗1
dϕ1
=
(a1 − a2) · (p¯− c1)ϕ2
ϕ1 · (−4c2ϕ1 + p¯ · (4ϕ1 − ϕ2) + c1ϕ2) (3.23)
The sign of the denominator is still assumed to be positive, as we have outlined
above. Hence, following the basic assumption a1 − a2 < 0 the whole fraction gets
negative and da
∗
1
dϕ1
< 0 holds.
Higher costs ϕ1 will incite health care provider 1 to expand his horizontal quality.
Only when health care provider 1 has a large cost advantage in ci he would accept
to converge to the other health care provider. Refering to the optimal value of q∗
higher costs ϕ0 will directly reduce the health care providers’ incentive to increase
vertical quality.
When we look at the parameter t we get:
da∗1
dt
=
2 · (a1 − a2) · (2c2ϕ1 − c1ϕ2 + p¯ · (−2ϕ1 + ϕ2))
t · (−4c2ϕ1 + p¯ · (4ϕ1 − ϕ2) + c1ϕ2) (3.24)
For the denominator the impact of the assumption concerning quality cost will be
helpful, too. The numerator will be negative for the range ϕ2
4
< ϕ1 <
ϕ2
2
. Hence,
the result could be da
∗
1
dt
> 0. The more ϕ1 converges to ϕ2 the more probable the
expected result da
∗
1
dt
< 0 gets. An increase in opportunity costs t will regularly
incite health care provider 1 to reduce his horizontal quality, i.e. to increase the
differentiation. Only if health care provider 1 has an advantage in the costs for
vertical quality ϕ1 < ϕ2 it could be optimal to expand horizontal quality and
reduce differentiation.
3.2.2 Standardization and the Impact on Competition
Up to now we have discussed the case where both health care providers could dif-
ferentiate horizontal and vertical quality. Now we introduce the idea of a standard
for vertical quality. We assume that both health care providers are not able to
12
anticipate this step by the regulator. They are not able to form expectations about
the timing, process or nature of the actual regulation and are therefore not able
to choose their competition parameters strategically. This is not entirely implau-
sible as things can change quickly in health care systems. For the purpose of this
model we assume that the regulator chooses the highest observable level of vertical
quality as standard.
The regulator perfectly sees the level of q∗1 and q∗2 and chooses the health care
provider with the higher quality. As the UK, Germany and Switzerland require
their independent health care providers to document their quality levels, the as-
sumption of an informed regulator is plausible. In the following we assume that
health care provider 1 has a higher qk than health care provider 2.21 In addition,
we assume that health care provider 1 has lower costs ϕ1 than health care provider
2. As a consequence of regulation, health care provider 2 has to accept the level
q∗1 ≡ q2 and provide a sub-optimal level of quality from his point of view.
The position of the indifferent patient changes to hStandard:
hStandard =
a1 − a2
2
(3.25)
Both health care providers choose the levels of a1 and a2 within the model. The
new profit function for the standard leader can be written as:
Π1 = (p¯− c1) · a1 + a2
2
−
(
ϕ1 · q
∗2
1
2
)
− CF1 (3.26)
Considering the first order condition the following holds:
∂Π1
∂a1
=
1
2
· (p¯− c1)− ϕ1 · q∗1 ·
dq∗1
da1
(3.27)
3.2.3 Impact of Regulation on Health Care Provider 1
For the discussion of the effects on the optimal horizontal quality a∗1 we apply
the total differentiation of the first order condition and insert the marginal effects
from the second stage. With other words, we assume the optimal level of vertical
quality for the quality leader and then look on standardization. As a fist step we
analyze the impact of a2 on a1:
da∗1Stand
d a2
= −
3·(p¯−c1)2
4t2·(a1−a2)4ϕ1
− 3·(p¯−c1)2
4t2·(a1−a2)4ϕ1
= 1 (3.28)
21We do not analyze the welfare maximizing level of qk.
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The result holds for every level of c1 and ϕ1. The quality leader has an incentive
to reduce the differentiation, provider 1 increases his horizontal quality.
For the impact of c1 on a1 the following holds:
da∗1Stand
dc1
= −2 · (a1 − a2) · (p¯− c1 + t
2(a1 − a2)3ϕ1)
3 · (p¯− c1)2 (3.29)
For p¯ < c1 − t2 · (a1 − a2)3ϕ1 the third term of the numerator is negative, as the
second term is negative per definition we can conclude that da
∗
1
dc1
< 0. Consequently,
a relatively small renumeration reduces the quality leader’s incentive to attract
more patients through an increase in horizontal quality. In this case an increase
in costs induces the quality leader to increase vertical differentiation in order to
drive away patients, reduce costs and increase profits.
For p¯ > c1 + t2 · (a1 − a2)3ϕ1 a positive impact of c1 on a1 increases the incentive
to expand the horizontal quality (da
∗
1
dc1
< 0). If the profit margin is high enough,
higher costs for basic quality provision encourage greater homogeneity from the
standard leader’s point of view.
Considering the parameter ϕi we get:
da∗1Stand
dϕ1
=
a1 − a2
3ϕ1
< 0 (3.30)
The expression will always be negative if the basic assumption a1 − a2 < 0 is still
valid. A higher cost for the provision of vertical quality reduces the incentive to
diminish horizontal differentiation.22
For the parameter t we get:
da∗1Stand
dt
= −2 · (a1 − a2)
3t
> 0 (3.31)
The expression will be always positive, if the basic assumptions are still valid.
Higher travelling or quality mismatch costs reduce the standard leader’s incentive
to differentiate horizontally.
3.2.4 Impact of Regulation on Health Care Provider 2
The next equations show the impact of vertical quality regulation on health care
provider 2’s decision for horizontal quality. He cannot implement his own optimal
22The following only holds as long as ϕ1 ≤ ϕ2.
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vertical quality and therefore we want to elaborate a˜2 when q˜2 holds. A change in
horizontal quality a1 has the following consequence for the standard follower:
da˜2Stand
d a1Stand
=−
3·(p¯−c1)2ϕ2
4t2·(a1−a2)4ϕ21
− 3·(p¯−c1)2ϕ2
4t2·(a1−a2)4ϕ21
= 1 (3.32)
The relationship between an alteration in a2 is mathematically identical to the
one scrutinized before. But we have to keep in mind that the original values
for a1 and a2 are fundamentally different. In particular, in the non-standardized
case a1 approached zero while a2 approached one. An increase in the level of a1
consequently diminishes horizontal differentiation while an increase in the level of
a2 increases it. This leads to the following interpretation of the above equation.
In contrast to the quality leader the follower has no incentive to reduce horizontal
quality variation, instead, he will try to keep the distance constant by increasing
his own horizontal quality when a1 increases.
Due to regulated vertical quality, competition can only take place through a choice
of locations or differences in the scope of treatments. For the standard follower
there is c. p. a high incentive to hold the distance in horizontal quality. For the
standard leader the opposite is true.
For the production costs c2 we get:
da˜2Stand
dc2
=
2t2(a1 − a2)4ϕ21
3 · (p¯− c1)2ϕ2 (3.33)
The sign is definitely negative as long as the basic assumption a1 − a2 < 0 holds.
The impact of c2 on a∗2 is unambiguous. As we assumed, the standard follower has
to bear higher vertical quality costs ϕ2. If there is a rise in the cost for basic health
services c2, the follower has an incentive to reduce the distance to the standard
follower.
For a change in ϕ2 the following is valid:
da˜2Stand
dϕ2
=
−a1 + a2
3ϕ2
(3.34)
The sign of the numerator is positive due to the basic assumption (a1 < a2).
Higher costs for producing vertical quality additionally diminish health care provider
2’s profits, and therefore his incentive to attract patients. Instead of increasing
the level of competition, he chooses a greater horizontal differentiation from the
quality leader to reach the point where his marginal quality costs equal marginal
returns.
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When we look at t we get:
da˜2Stand
dt
=
2(a1 − a2)
3t
(3.35)
The impact seems to be clear. The numerator is definitely negative, whereas the
denominator is always positive. A higher cost parameter t also encourages the
standard follower to reduce his horizontal quality.
4 Conclusion and Outlook
We use an extension of a Hotelling-model to analyse the impact of a standard-
ization on horizontal and vertical quality in a regional health care market. In
the reference case both health care providers compete in horizontal and vertical
quality. Our reference case tells us that the choice of horizontal quality ai will be
made conditionally on optimal vertical quality qK of the competitor. The success
of competing in vertical quality is directly dependent on the comparison of the cost
parameters ϕi of both competitors. As sequential profit maximization demands
that optimal vertical quality is chosen after horizontal quality is set, an exact
determination of the absolute height of the chosen vertical quality is impossible.
In the standardization case, all results hold for the standard leader. But, the stan-
dard follower loses control over horizontal and vertical quality as these become
dependent on the choices of the standard leader in the horizontal quality case and
on the regulator observing the quality leader in the vertical quality case. This leads
to a non-optimal level of vertical quality for the standard follower. The follower
is either driven out of the market, because he is not able to offer the standard
quality as the cost of doing so are prohibitively high for him or he has to accept
the quality chosen by the standard leader and make do with probably sub-optimal
profits.
Our results are directly related to the assumptions we make for the regional health
care market. Especially, we focus on a restricted area of horizontal quality both
health care providers are free to choose. For further research it would be interesting
to widen our approach by incorporating a more detailed discussion on the scope
and level of standardization. Moreover, it could be beneficial to widen the analysis
to the demand side where we can discuss some impacts of managed care within a
regional health care market.
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A Appendix
A.1 Vertical Quality
The second health care provider has to optimize the following profit function:
Π2 = (p¯− c2) ·
(
1−
(
q2 − q1
2t(a1 − a2) + a¯
))
−
(
ϕ2 · q
2
2
2
)
− CF (A.1)
The first order condition for the profit maximizing quality q2 is:
∂Π2
∂q2
= − p¯− c2
2t(a1 − a2) − q1 · ϕ2 = 0 (A.2)
The optimal level of q∗2 is:
q∗2 =
−p¯+ c2
2t(a1 − a2)ϕ2 (A.3)
Using comparative statics we get:
dq∗2
da2
= − p¯− c2
2t(a1 − a2)2 · ϕ2 ⇒
{
< 0, if p¯ ≥ c2
> 0, if p¯ < c2
(A.4)
dq∗2
da1
=
p¯− c2
2t(a1 − a2)2 · ϕ1 ⇒
{
> 0, if p¯ ≥ c2
< 0, if p¯ < c2
(A.5)
dq∗2
dt
=
p¯− c2
2t2 · (a1 − a2) · ϕ2 ⇒
{
< 0, if p¯ ≥ c2 and a1 < a2
> 0, if p¯ < c2 and a1 < a2
(A.6)
dq∗2
dp¯
= − 1
2t(a1 − a2) · ϕ2 > 0 if a1 < a2 (A.7)
dq∗2
dc2
=
1
2t(a1 − a2) · ϕ2 < 0 (A.8)
dq∗2
dϕ2
= − q2
ϕ1
< 0 (A.9)
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A.2 Horizontal Quality
For the optimal horizontal quality we insert the optimal values q∗1 and q2 into the
profit function (3.14) und compute in an explicit manner. Because we are looking
at a corner solution we get:
∂Π1
∂ a1
=
(−p¯+ c1)2
4t2ϕ1 · (a1 − a2)3 + (p¯− c1)·(
1
2
+
−p¯+c1
2tϕ1(a1−a2)2 −
−p¯+c2
2tϕ1(a1−a2)2
2t(a1 − a2) −
− −p¯+c1
2tϕ1(a1−a2) +
−p¯+c2
2tϕ1(a1−a2)
2t(a1 − a2)2
) (A.10)
The whole expression will be negative the less the second addend can compensate
the negative impact of the first addend. If there is no difference in vertical qual-
ity the second addend will be zero. Hence, the whole expression gets negative.
Considering the second derivation we get:
∂2Π1
∂ a21
= − 3(−p¯+ c1)
2
4t2ϕ1 · (a1 − a2)4 + (p¯− c1)·(− −p¯+c1
2tϕ1(a1−a2)3 +
−p¯+c2
2tϕ1(a1−a2)3
2t(a1 − a2) −
−p¯+c1
2tϕ1(a1−a2)2 −
−p¯+c2
2tϕ1(a1−a2)2
t · (a1 − a2)2 +
− −p¯+c1
2tϕ1·(a1−a2) +
−p¯+c2
2tϕ1·(a1−a2)
t(a1 − a2)3
)
(A.11)
As the first addend will be always negative and the expression within the brackets
encompasses positive as well as negative parts we can assume that the whole
formula gets negative considering the assumption done in the first derivative. The
result for the optimal choice of a1 given a2 can be computed by inserting the
optimal values q∗1 and q∗2 into the profit function (3.14) (cf. (A.10)):
a∗1 = a2 +
(−2t4p¯ϕ31ϕ22 + 2t4c2ϕ31ϕ22 + t4p¯ϕ21ϕ32 − t4c1ϕ21ϕ32)
1
3
2
1
3 t2ϕ1ϕ2
(A.12)
As we can see from (A.12) the optimal level of a∗1 depends on a2, the other
provider’s horizontal quality. We are looking at a reaction function a1(a2). The
corresponding reaction function for health care provider 2 is:
a∗2 =a1 +
(−t4p¯2ϕ31ϕ22 + 2t4p¯c2ϕ31ϕ22 − t4c22ϕ31ϕ22 + 2t4p¯2ϕ21ϕ32
2
2
3 t2ϕ1ϕ2
−2t4p¯c1ϕ21ϕ32 − 2t4p¯c2ϕ21ϕ32 + 2t4c1c2ϕ21ϕ32)
1
3
2
2
3 t2ϕ1ϕ2
(A.13)
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For the second provider holds:
∂Π2
∂ a2
= − (−p¯+ c2)
2
4t2ϕ1 · (a1 − a2)3
+ (p¯− c2) ·(
−
−p¯+c1
2tϕ2(a1−a2)2 +
−p¯+c2
2tϕ2(a1−a2)2
2t (a1 − a2) −
− −p¯+c1
2tϕ2(a1−a2) +
−p¯+c2
2tϕ2(a1−a2)
2t (a1 − a2)2
)
Referring to the result for the first health care provider we can assume that the
first derivation will be positive. Using some mathematics we can compute one
solution for a∗1 23:
a∗1 = a2 +
(−t4ϕ2p¯− t4ϕ2 c1 + 2t4ϕ2 c2) 13
2
1
3 t2ϕ
(A.14)
A.3 The Reference Case: Provider 2
For the impact of a1 on a∗2 holds:
da∗2
da1
=−
−3·(p¯−c2)(−c2ϕ1+p¯(ϕ1−2ϕ2)+2c1ϕ2)
4t2(a1−a2)4ϕ1ϕ2
3·(p¯−c2)(−c2ϕ1+p¯(ϕ1−2ϕ2)+2c1ϕ2)
4t2(a1−a2)4ϕ1ϕ2
= 1 (A.15)
As we can see a variation of the level of a1 will be perfectly equalized by a change
in the optimal level of a∗2.
da∗2
dp¯
=
−(2(a1 − a2) · (p¯(ϕ1 − 2ϕ2) + (c1 − t2 · (a1 − a2)3ϕ1)ϕ2 + c2(−ϕ1 + ϕ2)))
(3(p¯− c2) · (−c2ϕ1 + p¯(ϕ1 − 2ϕ2) + 2c1ϕ2))
(A.16)
The impact of the regulated price p¯ depends on the value of ci and ϕ:
• If c1 = c2 an increase in p¯ will expand the horizontal differentiation if ϕ1 >
2ϕ2. For ϕ2 > 12ϕ1 an increase could probably reduce the incentive for more
horizontal differentiation.
• If ϕ1 = ϕ2 and given a low starting level of p¯ an increase in p¯ would incite
Health Provider 2 to reduce horizontal differentiation. Only for high levels
of p¯ the incentive could be reverse.
23There exist two other values which encompasses complex numbers.
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• If all cost parameters are different no definite result can be inferred.
da∗2
dc2
= −2 · (a1 − a2) · (c2ϕ1 − (c1 − t
2(a1 − a2)3ϕ2)ϕ2 + p¯(−ϕ1 + ϕ2))
3 · (p¯− c2)·)(−c2ϕ1 + p¯ · (ϕ1 − 2ϕ2) + 2c1ϕ2) (A.17)
• If ϕ1 = ϕ2 holds and the starting level of p¯ is low an increase in costs c2 will
induce the Health Care Provider 2 to reduce horizontal differentiation. Only
with a high starting level the opposite case can be true.
• If the costs parameters are different no direct result can be inferred.
da∗2
dϕ2
=
(a1 − a2) · (p¯− c2)ϕ1
3ϕ2 · (−c2ϕ1 + p¯(ϕ1 − 2ϕ2) + 2c1ϕ2) (A.18)
As the numerator is always negative the sign of the fraction depends on the de-
nominator. If p¯ > c2ϕ1−2c1ϕ2
ϕ1−2ϕ2 holds the denominator is positive and higher cost of
producing vertical quality would result in smaller scope of horizontal differentia-
tion. The lower the regulated price is the more the Health Care Provider would
substitute higher costs for vertical quality with an expansion of horizontal quality.
da∗2
dt
=
2 · (a1 − a2)
3t
(A.19)
The is result is unambiguous. The more the patient face higher opportunity costs
the more the health care provider would reduce his difference to the competitor.
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